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Energy efﬁciency is a key policy strategy to meet some of the challenges being faced today and to plan for
a sustainable future. Numerous empirical studies in various sectors suggest that there are cost-effective
measures that are available but not always implemented due to existence of barriers to energy efﬁciency.
Several cost-effective energy efﬁcient options (technologies for new and existing ships and operations)
have also been identiﬁed for improving energy efﬁciency of ships. This paper is one of the ﬁrst to em-
pirically investigate barriers to energy efﬁciency in the shipping industry using a novel framework and
multidisciplinary methods to gauge implementation of cost-effective measures, perception on barriers
and observations of barriers. It draws on ﬁndings of a survey conducted of shipping companies, content
analysis of shipping contracts and analysis of energy efﬁciency data. Initial results from these methods
suggest the existence of the principal agent problem and other market failures and barriers that have also
been suggested in other sectors and industries. Given this ﬁnding, policies to improve implementation of
energy efﬁciency in shipping need to be carefully considered to improve their efﬁcacy and avoid unin-
tended consequences.
& 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
1.1. Background
Shipping is a derived demand, i.e. it exists in response to de-
mand for the transport of freight. Transportation, and particularly
shipping, thus plays a critical role in the global economy and as
such is one of the key enablers of globalisation. The shipping in-
dustry supplies a safe, reliable and cheap form of transport con-
necting the world’s consumers with the world’s raw materials and
skilled, low-cost labour markets. Given the high correlation be-
tween the historic relationship of global Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) and shipping activity (measured in tonne miles, i.e. payload
by distance) as shown in Fig. 1, the global GDP can be used to somer Ltd. This is an open access article
tulla).extent estimate the demand for future shipping activity, although
currently this relationship is showing signs of decoupling. At an
annual GDP growth rate of around three to four per cent, it is
estimated that shipping’s activity will increase by around 200–
300% by 2050 (Buhaug et al., 2009; Smith et al., 2014).
This continued growth rate brings with it several challenges
which may question the sustainability of the shipping industry;
one of them being climate change. Energy efﬁciency (i.e. increas-
ing productivity using the same amount of energy) is one of the
strategies to address the issues of climate change (UNEP, 2011) and
other strategies include using renewable energy sources (e.g. solar,
wind), using fuels with lower carbon content (e.g. liquid natural
gas and biofuels) and using emission reduction technologies (e.g.
through chemical conversion, capture and storage). Currently, the
global transport sector emissions represent around 13% of global
CO2 emissions, of which total shipping CO2 emissions (from in-
ternational and domestic shipping) accounted for over 3% (aroundunder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Fig. 1. Historic relationship between shipping activity and GDP Data from UNCTAD
(1997–2008) and Clarksons (2010).
Fig. 2. International shipping emissions based on IPCC SRES Scenarios.
Source: Buhaug et al. (2009).
Fig. 3. Explaining the energy efﬁciency gap.
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sions in comparison to the cargo transported, makes shipping the
most energy efﬁcient form of transport compared to air, road and
rail (Buhaug et al., 2009). However, given the aforementioned
growth rate, it is estimated that shipping’s CO2 emissions will
grow by one and half to three times under the business-as-usual
scenario (compared to emissions in 2007) by 2050 as shown in
Fig. 2. Hence there is an even greater need for improving energy
efﬁciency of the ships. The industry has adopted ‘ﬁrst of its kind’
international regulation in its efforts to mitigate CO2 emissions,
the energy efﬁciency design index (EEDI), a command and control,
design based standard that is tightened every ﬁve years from 2015
to 2030, but its impact is estimated to be only around 25% re-
duction in CO2 emissions on business as usual by 2050 (Bazari and
Longva, 2011).
Currently, fuel costs in shipping generally account for between
50% and70% of a ship’s operating costs, which is set to increase as
Heavy Fuel Oil (HFO)1 costs increase, creating further incentives
towards energy efﬁciency in shipping. More than ﬁfty measures
(Eide et al., 2009; Buhaug et al., 2009; Wang et al., 2010) have been
identiﬁed that could result in efﬁciency gains and they are gen-
erally grouped as technical measures (some applicable to new and
some to existing ships) and operational measures. These measures
along with their abatement potentials have also been presented in
several shipping speciﬁc marginal abatement cost curves2
(MACC’s) (Buhaug et al., 2009; Faber et al., 2011; Eide et al., 2009;
Wang et al., 2010) that commonly feature measures, especially
operational measures, that are cost-effective. A cost-effective
measure is one that is economically efﬁcient (yields a positive Net
Present Value) and energy efﬁcient (Sweeney, 1993; Golove and
Eto, 1996). Yet, the implementation of these cost-effective mea-
sures has not been empirically examined in shipping and this
paper attempts to gauge this with a view to understanding the
barriers that may be inhibiting the uptake of such measures.1 A type of residual fuel oil that is the predominant type of fuel used in ships.
2 A common method to calculating the techno-economic potential of CO2 re-
ducing measures and the order in which they may be adopted.1.2. Barriers to energy efﬁciency
The barriers to energy efﬁciency debate has gained momentum
since the 1980’s with the ﬁrst bibliographical account of barriers to
energy efﬁciency by followed by empirical research by Blumstein
et al. (1980), which is then followed by a host of literature, see for
example Fisher and Rothkopf (1989), Hirst and Brown (1990),
Howarth and Andersson (1993), Sanstad and Howarth (1994), Jaffe
and Stavins (1994), Howarth and Andersson (1993) Howarth et al.
(2000), Thollander and Palm (2013). Several studies across a wide
range of sectors and regions have empirically shown that cost-
effective energy efﬁciency measures are not always implemented
despite the substantial abatement potential, see for example Vel-
thuijsen (1993), Gillissen and Opschoor (1994), Harris et al. (2000)
Sorrel et al. (2004), Zilahy (2004), Rohdin et al. (2007), Shi et al.
(2008), Sardianou (2008), Thollander and Ottosson (2008),
Schleich (2009), Hasanbeigi et al. (2009), Trianni et al. (2012). A
common conclusion of these studies, mainly based on respondent
perceptions (measured through surveys), has been the identiﬁca-
tion of a range of barriers that result in a sub-optimal level of
uptake. They deﬁne barriers as postulated mechanisms that inhibit
investment in technologies which are both energy efﬁcient and
economically efﬁcient (Sorrel et al., 2004). The difference between
the actual or observed lower levels of implementation of cost-ef-
fective measures and the higher level that would appear to be
cost-effective from the consumers or ﬁrms point of view based on
techno-economic analysis (Brown, 2001; Golove and Eto, 1996) is
referred to as the ‘energy efﬁciency gap’ (Jaffe and Stavins, 1994).
Some of the energy efﬁciency gap can be explained by rational
behaviour to market barriers that may not be captured by the
techno-economic analysis. If these can be accurately modelled,
then the remaining energy efﬁciency gap can be explained by
market failures, behavioural and organisational barriers as shown
in Fig. 3. The magnitude of the energy efﬁciency gap will also be
dependent on the extent to which models address take-up of
measures and the way implementation is measured.
According to Brown (2001) market barriers are obstacles that
are not based on market failures but nonetheless contribute to the
slow diffusion and adoption of energy efﬁcient measures. They canFig. 4. Classiﬁcation of barriers.
Table 1
Cost allocations in shipping.
Table 2
Principal agent problems in shipping contracts.
Principal selects
technology
Principal cannot se-
lect technology
Principal pays energy bill
(direct energy payment)
No principal agent
problem. Case 1
Efﬁciency problem.
Case 2
Cargo owner operated
ships
Time chartered ships
Principal does not pay en-
ergy bill (indirect energy
payment)
Usage and efﬁciency
problem. Case 3
Usage problem.
Case 4
N.A Voyage chartered
ships
Fig. 5. Depiction of principal agent problems in shipping contracts.
Fig. 6. Framework to investigate barriers to energy efﬁciency in shipping.
Fig. 7. Sampling method and sampling frame.
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“where the organisation is behaving rationally given the risk ad-
justed rate of return on an investment in the existing context of
energy, capital and unavoidable ‘hidden’ costs” (Sorrell et al., 2004,
p33). These are real features of the decision making environment,
albeit ones which are difﬁcult to incorporate in engineering-eco-
nomic modelling (Sorrell et al., 2000). A market failure on the
other hand occurs when the requirements for efﬁcient or optimal
allocation of resources through well-functioning markets areviolated, which leads to incomplete markets, imperfect competi-
tion, imperfect and asymmetric information, i.e. they result in a
ﬂaw in the way a market operates (Brown, 2001). The important
distinction between market barriers and market failures is to do
with the legitimacy of policy intervention to rectify market failures
(Sorrell et al., 2004; Thollander and Palm, 2013).
According to Weber (1997) barriers are intangible and it is
“empirically impossible” (Weber, 1997, p. 834) to ﬁnd the true
reason for lack of action and Blumstein et al. (1980) suggests that
the causes of barriers are often interlinked and follow a causal
chain. Nonetheless, Sorrell et al. (2000 and 2004) provide a useful
framework for investigating barriers to energy efﬁciency by cate-
gorising them as shown in Fig. 4, although other ways of cate-
gorising barriers have also been presented (UNEP, 2006; Shi et al.,
2008; etc.). For a full description of these barriers refer to Sorrel
et al. (2004) and Thollander and Palm (2013) and in context of
shipping refer to Rehmatulla and Smith (2012).
It has been noted that barriers to energy efﬁciency differ de-
pending on industry sector and region (Rohdin et al., 2007), which
Table 3
Population divided according to major geographic regions for large and medium
ﬁrmsn.
EU West Asia SC Far East Total
Wetbulk Large 9 (2%) 6 (1%) 2 (0%) 10 (2%) 27 (5%)
Wetbulk Medium 88 (15%) 6 (1%) 14 (2%) 33 (6%) 141 (24%)
Drybulk Large 4 (1%) 3 (1%) 1 (0%) 10 (2%) 18 (3%)
Drybulk Medium 75 (13%) 11 (2%) 6 (1%) 49 (8%) 141 (24%)
Container Large 13 (2%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 11 (2%) 24 (4%)
Container Medium 37 (6%) 4 (1%) 2 (0%) 14 (2%) 57 (10%)
Mixed Large 23 (4%) 1 (0%) 4 (1%) 21 (4%) 49 (8%)
Mixed Medium 80 (13%) 1 (0%) 8 (1%) 54 (9%) 143 (24%)
329 (55%) 32 (5%) 37 (6%) 202 (34%) 600 (100%)
n Companies were only included in the sampling frame if they belonged to one
or more of the sectors of interest i.e. companies that actively traded in the wetbulk,
drybulk and container sector. Actively traded in sector is deﬁned when more than
90% of the company’s ﬂeet is engaged in the any one of the sectors. Companies
actively engaged in all the above sectors were categorised as operating in mixed
sectors.
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is both industry and region speciﬁc. From the foregoing review, it
can be seen that previous empirical studies mainly focussed at
ﬁrms in non-transport sectors (speciﬁcally industrial) e.g. Vel-
thuijsen (1993), Sardinaou (2008), Sorrell et al. (2000), thus have
ignored the transportation and shipping sectors and that they
predominantly focussed on the perception of industry stake-
holders. There is very scarce literature, mainly in the form of in-
dustry reports that look at the subject of barriers to energy efﬁ-
ciency in shipping e.g. Faber et al. (2011), Maddox Consulting
(2012) and most of these do not base their analysis on any es-
tablished barriers framework or theories as well as being metho-
dologically weak in their methods e.g. sampling (Rehmatulla,
2014). Having recognised this gap, this paper attempts to empiri-
cally investigate the energy efﬁciency gap in shipping with parti-
cular focus on the principal agent problem that could be affecting
implementation of cost-effective measures in shipping.Fig. 8. Survey respond2. Method
2.1. Characterising principal agent problems in shipping
Within the context of barriers to energy efﬁciency, agency
theory has been utilised to explain some of the market failures,
such as the split incentives and asymmetric information (Levinson
and Neimann, 2003; Murtishaw and Sathaye, 2006; Prindle et al.,
2006; IEA, 2007; Graus and Worrel, 2008; Vernon and Meier,
2012). The theory aims to create the most efﬁcient contracts for
the ubiquitous agency relationship, in which one party (the prin-
cipal) delegates work to another (the agent), who performs that
work (Ross, 1973; Eisenhardt, 1989) or when one individual de-
pends on the action of another (Pratt and Zeckhauser, 1985) and
delegates some decision making authority (Jensen and Meckling,
1976). From the perspective of the key stakeholders involved in
shipping, the shipowner and the charterer can be seen as being
involved in an agency relationship, where the principal i.e. the
charterer hires the shipowner as an agent to provide service of
carrying goods from A to B, this classiﬁcation follows Murtishaw
and Sathaye (2006), IEA (2007), Vernon and Meier (2012) and
Veenstra and Dalen (2011). The theory aims to resolve two agency
problems that occur as a result of this relationship:entProblem 1: The desires or the goals of the principal and agent
conﬂict (split incentives problem) Problem 2: It is difﬁcult or expensive to verify agent’s actions
(informational problem)
To date, the principal agent problem (i.e. split incentives com-
ponent of the agency theory in context of energy efﬁciency) has
been investigated generally through applying a set methodology
(Prindle et al., 2006; IEA, 2007; Vernon and Meier, 2012) to esti-
mate the effect of principal agent problem on energy efﬁciency.
The ﬁrst step is to identify situations where principal agent pro-
blem may occur. In shipping there are two basic forms of contracts
(charterparties) for carriage of goods with which the shipowner-demographics.
Table 4
Required sample sizes and actual responses achievedn.
Sector Size Population 715% error (90% CL) 720% error (90% CL) 715% error (95% CL) 720% error (95% CL) Actual results achieved
Wetbulk Large 27 15 11 17 13 9
Medium 141 25 16 33 21 17
Drybulk Large 18 12 9 13 11 3
Medium 141 25 16 33 21 17
Container Large 24 14 11 16 13 1
Medium 57 20 14 25 18 4
Mixed Large 49 19 13 24 17 6
Medium 143 25 16 34 21 27
All Small E1000 30 17 41 24 20
n The actual results may be higher than what is shown for each stratum because not all respondents completed demographic questions and due to partial responses.
Table 5
Grouping the chartering ratio and survey respondents.
Group Description Survey indicator N
1 – Case 4 Majority of the ﬂeet is owned and majority of the ﬂeet is chartered out on voyage charter. 450% owned and 450% chartered out on voyage 21
2 – Case 2 Majority of the ﬂeet is owned and majority of the ﬂeet is chartered out on time charter. 450% owned and 450% chartered out on time 21
3 – Case 4 Management company with majority of its managed ﬂeet out on voyage charter. 450% chartered out on voyage 9
4 – Case 2 Management company with majority of its managed ﬂeet out on time charter. 450% chartered out on time 20
Table 6
Regrouping into two groups.
Group Description Grouping rule N
1 – Case 4 Majority of the ﬂeet is chartered out
on voyage charter.
450% chartered out on
voyage
30
2 – Case 2 Majority of the ﬂeet is chartered out
on time charter.
450% chartered out on
time
41
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time charter. There are other types of contracts but these are not
contracts for carriage of goods, for example the bareboat charter is
a lease of the vessel to the charterer. Other hybrid forms of char-
ters also exist but these can be reclassiﬁed as either voyage or time
charter due to the similarities in the cost allocation, examples of
these are trip charters which fall into time charter category despite
the contract being for a single voyage and Contracts of Affreight-
ment (COA) which fall into the voyage charter category despite the
time element (Wilson, 2010; Stopford, 2008). The voyage and time
charters allocate or divide the responsibility for capital and run-
ning costs (including fuel costs) between a shipowner-operator
and charterer as shown in Table 1. The result of this divided re-
sponsibility for costs is that both parties could have diverging or
conﬂicting interests to minimise their share of costs at different
points in time (e.g. design, operation, sale etc.) Table 2 and Fig. 5
identify where principal agent problems may exist in shipping.
The above suggests that the speciﬁc structure of the shipping
markets could be susceptible to market barriers and failures, but to
date there has been little work to quantify the consequence of any
failures and to test rigorously for their existence. In this paper, the
focus is mainly on Case 2 (as shown in Table 2 and Fig. 5), which
represents the principal agent efﬁciency problem that occurs in
time chartered ships. In the time charter, the shipowner-operator
(classed as an agent providing the service), determines the level of
technological energy efﬁciency, while the time charterer (classed
as a principal demanding the service) bears the costs associated
with that level of energy efﬁciency (Agnolucci et al., 2014). The
extent of this problem is therefore directly related to how well thecharter rate reﬂects the ships energy efﬁciency, in other words, to
what extent are shipowner-operators rewarded (for an energy
efﬁcient ship) through higher time charter rates, as a result of cost
savings made by the time charterer. Agnolucci et al. (2014) explore
this for the drybulk panamax ships and ﬁnd that 40% of the fuel
savings are recouped by the shipowner-operators through higher
charter rates for the period 2008–2012. This has important im-
plications for effectiveness of policies being considered at global
and regional levels.
2.2. Framework for methodological for triangulation
From the foregoing review, one can conclude that it is im-
portant not only to measure the perception of barriers to energy
efﬁciency, but to also seek other means of corroborating the per-
ceptions i.e. validating them in order to investigate the multi-
faceted nature of barriers to energy efﬁciency. This paper attempts
this by investigating perceptions and observations of barriers to
energy efﬁciency, using the mixed methods (Greene et al., 1989;
Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2003) approach to triangulate (Denzin,
1970) the research ﬁndings, as shown in Fig. 6. In doing so, the
research questions that the work informing this paper aims to
consider include;1. What are indications from the industry on the implementation
of different energy efﬁciency measures?2. What are the industry’s perceptions of barriers to energy
efﬁciency?3. What barriers can be observed in shipping contracts and from
actual energy efﬁciency data?4. What can the combination of methods tell us about shipping’s
energy efﬁciency gap?
In answering these research questions, it is beyond the scope of
this paper to discuss all of the aforementioned barriers to energy
efﬁciency for shipping in sufﬁcient detail. For a discussion of the
above mentioned barriers in context of shipping refer to Re-
hmatulla and Smith (2012), Rehmatulla (2012), Rehmatulla et al.
(2013), Faber et al. (2011) and Maddox Consulting (2012). This
Table 7
Categorising response choice to speciﬁc barriers to energy efﬁciency.
Survey response choices Barrier Type
a) Savings cannot be fully
recouped
Split incentives Market failures
b) Lack of direct control over
operations
c) Difﬁcult to implement
under some types of
charter
d) (Divided responsibility for
fuel costs)
a) Lack of reliable information
on cost and savings
Informational
problems
b) (Lack of information shar-
ing on savings among
parties)
a) Uncertain/long payback Risk Market barriers
(non-market
failures)
b) Immature technology
c) Sailing off design
conditions
a) Lack of access to capital Capital
a) Additional costs e.g.
transactional
Hidden costs Modelling artefacts
b) Opportunity costs
a) Unsuitable to trade/route of
operation
Heterogeneity
b) Incompatible with other
measures
a) Not allowed due to charter-
party clauses
General/other speciﬁc
to shipping
b) Standard charterparty
clauses
c) Inadequate port
infrastructure
Table 8
Charterparties analysed.
Sector Voyage charterparties Time charterparties
Wetbulk BIMCHEMVOY INTERTANKTIME
INTERTANKVOY BIMCHEMTIME
ASBATANKVOY BPTIME 3
BEEPEEVOY 4 SHELLTIME
SHELLVOY 6
Drybulk COALOREVOY BHPBTIME03
OREVOY BALTIME
NIPPONORE GENTIME
POLCOLVOY NYPE 46
SYNACOMEX NYPE 93
BHPBVOY03 ASBATIME
NIPPONCOAL BOXTIME
NUBALTWOOD
RIO DOCE ORE
AMWELSH
GRAINCON
General GENCON
SCANCON
NUVOY
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Section 2.1.2.3. Survey description
A thorough evaluation of the research strategies, research de-
signs, research methods and research modes was conducted to ﬁnd
the best approach to investigating barriers to energy efﬁciency and
answering the research questions aforementioned (Rehmatulla,
2014). In conclusion an online survey following the tailored design
method (TDM) (Dillman, 2007) was administered to assess the ac-
tual uptake of energy efﬁcient operational interventions that were
perceived to be cost-effective for shipping and to obtain views on
barriers to their implementation. The survey attempted to measure
three different types of variables (de Vaus, 1995): Measures of the dependent variable (what the research is try-
ing to explain), in this case implementation of measures and
perception of barriers to energy efﬁciency. Measures of the independent variable (causal variables), in this
case chartering ratio or group. Measures of test variables (clarifying the link between in-
dependent and dependent variable similar to the background
measures such as age, sex, religion, etc.), in this case sector of
operation, company type and company size.
The online survey makes use of a list based sampling method,
similar method to traditional sampling (Fricker, 2008) and the
initial list for the sampling frame was derived from the Clarksons
Shipping Information Network (SIN). There are many other sam-
pling frames (or online databases) that represent to a good degree
the population of interest, such as the IHS Fairplay Sea-web, WorldShipping Register and Infomarine. Clarksons SIN has the most up
to date information and it is believed that this is the most com-
prehensive list of the target population. Upon comparison with
other online databases such as World Shipping Register slight
under-coverage of companies was noted, suggesting a non-cover-
age error/frame coverage bias, for which every effort was made to
merge the frames to cover as accurately as possible the target
population. Thus a completely new frame had to be constructed
for the purposes of this research.
Fig. 7 shows that the census tracts approach was used to con-
tact the large and medium sized companies and these were stra-
tiﬁed according to the sector of operation and location (by head-
quarters) as shown in Table 3. For small sized ﬁrms a simpliﬁed
random sample was used.
The sampling frame represented well the different variables
(sector, size and region) which other similar studies in shipping
have lacked, although over-representing respondents from the
European region (Fig. 8). Further details on the design and im-
plementation of the survey can be found in Rehmatulla (2014). In
order to be representative and to make generalisations i.e. reach
statistically signiﬁcant results with a conﬁdence level of 90% or
95% and margin of error interval of 715% or 720% each stratum
required a certain number of responses as shown in Table 4. The
total number of respondents was 170, which consisted of 120 al-
most complete (90% item response) responses and 50 partially
completed responses.
Other than ensuring the correct sampling methods and stra-
tegies (in order to reduce sampling error), the survey also uses
different techniques to improve response rates and reduce non-
sampling errors (coverage, measurement, non-response error)
(Groves et al., 2004); Use of Tailored Design Method (Dillman, 2007) – personalisation,
pre-notiﬁcation, deadlines, reminders, mixed mode follow ups. Design of questionnaire – visual appearance, content, type of
questions, and length of survey (determined through pilot re-
search and pre-testing and well evaluated web survey software
as well as guidelines from Dillman (2007)). Use of incentives – non monetary, survey results report.
The principal agent problem in other sectors (e.g. buildings
residential and commercial) has been represented by assessing the
proportion of properties that are owner-occupied and those that
Fig. 9. Average implementation rate of cost-effective operational measures.
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cipal agent problem in shipping could be represented using the
chartering ratio or chartering level of a shipping company as
shown in Table 5 and this was used as an indicator of principal
agent problem in the survey. This indicator can also be regrouped
in to two chartering groups, one representing respondents with
majority of their ﬂeet chartered out voyage (i.e. combining group
one and three) and another group representing respondents with
majority of the ﬂeet chartered out time (i.e. combining group two
and four) (Table 6). These groups can be said to be reﬂecting the
cases presented in Table 2 and Fig. 5.
Most studies (e.g. Murtishaw and Sathaye, 2006; IEA, 2007;
Vernon and Meier, 2012; Bird and Hernandez, 2012; Pelenur and
Cruickshank, 2012) focus on technical energy efﬁciency and show
that the principal agent efﬁciency problem exists, since the tech-
nical efﬁciency levels of different principal agent cases differ sig-
niﬁcantly. However, to date only a handful of studies have em-
pirically investigated how implementation of operational mea-
sures is affected by the principal agent problem (Levinson and
Neimann, 2003; Young and Maruejols, 2010; Gillingham et al.,
2011; Maruejols and Young, 2011). Maruejols and Young (2011)
suggest that split incentives impact some aspects of occupant
behaviour, such as households that do not pay directly for their
energy opting for increased thermal comfort and being less sen-
sitive to whether or not somebody is at home and the severity of
the climate when deciding on temperature settings, thus being
operationally inefﬁcient compared to households that pay for their
energy. Most of the studies for example hypothesise that house-
holds on rental market (with no energy included) will have lower
implementation of technical measures, and this has been con-
ﬁrmed by several studies (e.g. Graus and Worrel, 2008; IEA, 2007;
Berchling and Smith, 1994; Bird and Hernandez, 2012; Pelenur and
Cruickshank, 2012). It is important to extend this original hy-
pothesis to investigate that the same rental households (with no
energy included rents) may have better operational efﬁciency,
based on the principal agent incentives. Conversely, households on
rental markets (with energy included in rents) will have higher
implementation of technical measures but may suffer from lower
implementation of operational measures. The key here is the end
user’s or tenant’s (principal’s) incentives to conserve energy.
Whilst operational efﬁciency in households or other sectors may
not be as important, it certainly is in the case of shipping. Smith
et al. (2013) show that there is a wide range of operational efﬁ-
ciencies for different ship types, suggesting a greater potential for
energy efﬁciency or CO2 reduction through these measures
The second purpose of the survey was to gauge the perception
of barriers to operational energy efﬁciency measures. This wasmeasured in two ways; the ﬁrst method is brief and uses general
barriers classiﬁcation in a single grid for the measures that were
believed not to have a high fuel saving potential. The second
method is through asking respondents tailored follow-up ques-
tions on the measures they had selected had high potential but
had not yet implemented (e.g. Trialling, plan to implement, etc.).
The response choices that were presented to the respondents were
then grouped according to the barriers categories they fall into
(Table 7). This approach of providing more speciﬁc choices and
then recoding them as general barriers is adapted from previous
research by Sorrell et al. (2000) and Thollander and Ottosson
(2008).
2.4. Charterparty content analysis
Qualitative content analysis of charterparties is used as a
method to observe the level of principal agent problem in ship-
ping. The use of qualitative inductive content analysis is re-
commended when there are no previous studies dealing with the
phenomenon or when knowledge is fragmented (Elo and Kyngas,
2008). In order to limit the research to a manageable body of texts
and to collect data by means of sampling that minimises bias, a
relevance sampling strategy is used. This sampling method is ty-
pical of qualitative research as it helps to enhance the under-
standing of the information-rich case (Sandelowski, 2000; Patton,
1990; Bryman, 2008). In order to identify the most important
standard form charterparties an email was sent to twenty survey
respondents who were selected based on the primary sector of
their company. The survey contained a detailed list of standard
form charterparties for each sector and the respondents were
asked to select and comment on the most commonly used char-
terparties. This brief investigation conﬁrmed that there are about
ﬁfteen to twenty most often used standard form voyage and time
charterparties. The standard form charterparties are usually
modiﬁed in two ways, by use of rider clauses agreed between the
parties and generally be appended to the standard clauses and
amending the actual clauses. The result of these modiﬁcations is
that sometimes the ﬁnal agreement bears little resemblance to the
original standard form (Wilson, 2010). Acknowledging this possi-
bility, the focus of this analysis is nonetheless focussed on the
standard form charterparties for ease of comparison. Based on this
brief research, literature on most often used charterparties from
UNCTAD (1990) and from Baltic and International Maritime
Council’s (BIMCO) charterparty editor (IDEA), the most relevant
charterparties to analyse were selected and are presented in
Table 8.
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Step four of the framework also attempts to observe the level of
the principal agent problem in shipping and compare this with
results from the survey and contract content analysis. Murtishaw
and Sathaye (2006), Prindle et al. (2006) and IEA (2007) suggest
estimating the population of end users that are affected by the
principal agent problem followed by the estimation of the energy
consumption affected by the principal agent problem. A separate
study by Smith et al. (2013) assessed the technical and operational
efﬁciency of ships using satellite automatic identiﬁcation system
(S-AIS). In order to investigate whether energy consumption varies
by the principal agent cases, data on technical and operational
efﬁciency is split in the two main forms of charter using additional
ﬁxtures data from Clarksons Shipping Information Network (SIN).
Data is ﬁltered for ships that occur only in one type of ﬁxture for
the period of analysis (2011), thus removes subletting of ships and
ships interchanging from one type of charter to another. The ﬁl-
tering results in a very small count of ships on time charter and
therefore statistical signiﬁcance could not be achieved in this
analysis.3. Results
3.1. Survey results
Fig. 9 shows to what extent the highest fuel saving potential
measures selected by the respondents have been implemented.
This approach of gauging implementation is similar to other em-
pirical studies (Velthuijsen, 1993; Gillisen and Opschoor, 1994;
Harris et al., 2000; Sorrel et al., 2004). The implementation in the
survey was originally based on ﬁve choices; ‘considering or trial-
ling’, ‘considered and decided against’, ‘plan to implement’, ‘al-
ready implemented’ and ‘did not consider’. These have been later
recoded as implemented (already implemented) and not im-
plemented (which includes the remainder categories) as this al-
lows for crosstabulation and elaboration analysis for relationships
between size, sector and chartering group. From Fig. 9 it can be
seen that even the top three cost-effective operational measures
that were deemed to be of highest potential have actual im-
plementation rate of around 60–70% (79% for 95% conﬁdence
level). The average implementation across all the measures drops
to around 50%, ranging from 35% to 70%.
Analysis of the responses to the perception questions shows
that there are speciﬁc barriers pertaining to each of the measures,
as shown in Table 9. Lack of reliable information on cost and
savings are mainly related to the more technical operational
measures such as weather routing, autopilot adjustment, trim/
draft optimisation although these have been shown to be mature
technologies (Maddox Consulting, 2012) for which information is
readily and reliably available (Lockley et al., 2011). On the other
hand, for measures mainly related to speed (general speed re-
duction and Just In Time arrivals) or those that had an element of
speed (efﬁcient voyage execution and optimisation of ballast
voyages) the respondents mainly cited that these were difﬁcult to
implement under different types of charter and that charterparties
did not allow for implementation, which are indicators of split
incentives component of the principal agent problem.
Under the time charter, the charterer who has operational
control of the ship is mainly responsible for the speed of the ships
and under voyage charter where the shipowner has operational
control of the ship the speed is set through use of charterparty.
Therefore, in general only in the ballast leg is a shipowner operator
allowed to decide the speed of the vessel. The speed at which a
ship travels varies according to many factors such as the sector it
Fig. 10. Perception of barriers to energy efﬁciency.
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involved etc., which will be further investigated in through con-
tent analysis of charterparties. As shown in Fig. 10, the re-
spondents perceived the split incentives barrier as the most im-
portant barrier to implementation of operational energy efﬁciency
measures. These combined with informational problems as market
failures outweighed the non-market failures (market barriers)
such as risk, costs etc. This ﬁnding goes further than those of Faber
et al. (2011) and Maddox Consulting (2012) that suggest that all
types of barriers including split incentives affect the uptake of
cost-effective measures.
3.2. Content analysis of contracts
From the modelling, survey results and literature, the speed re-
duction measure is considered as the most important measure that
could affect the energy efﬁciency of ships. Following Creswell (2009)
sequential explanatory design, the charterparty content analysis
therefore focussed on the identiﬁcation of barriers to speed reduction.
A detailed content analysis of the voyage and time standard form
charterparties highlighted interesting corroborative ﬁndings to the
survey results e.g. respondents citing standard charterparty clauses as
the most important barrier to speed reduction. Close reading of the
charterparties revealed that there were different express obligations of
utmost despatch (the obligation to proceed at full speed once the
cargo is loaded) which are consequently coded into four categories
under the goal conﬂict proposition of the agency theory (Eisenhardt,
1989) as shown in Table 10. Table 11 summarises the results of the
charterparty content analysis of nineteen voyage charterparties. The
results suggest that the focus of the contracts is around resolving the
goal conﬂict problem within the agency relationship and this conse-
quently affects the implementation of cost-effective measures speci-
ﬁcally the speed reduction measure.
3.3. Fixtures analysis
Fig. 11 shows the technical efﬁciency, speed reduction im-
plementation (design vs. operational ratio) and the operational
efﬁciency comparisons for the wetbulk and drybulk sector and
how the observations differ for the two principal agent cases; case
two being the time charter and case four being the voyage charter.
These parameters are an attempt to reﬂect the real or practical
differences between the principal agent cases.4. Discussion
The average implementation rate obtained across all the op-
erational measures (50%) is slightly lower compared to that ob-
tained by Faber et al. (2011) survey of ﬁve shipowners, who report
implementation for operational measures of around 60%. Similarly,
Maddox Consulting (2012) based on expert judgement report
implementation of six operational measures to be around 65%. The
answers to this question clearly show that despite the easiness of
implementation and short payback of most cost-effective opera-
tional measures (Wang et al., 2009; Lockley et al., 2011) some
measures still do not see high implementation rates. The average
implementation rate is to some extent comparable to that ob-
served in non-shipping sectors. Harris et al. (2000) show an im-
plementation rate of energy efﬁcient measures implemented by
industrial ﬁrms to be around 80% (based on an audit re-
commendation of six measures, selected out of a thirteen speciﬁc
measures, therefore suggesting a net implementation around 45%).
For households or residential sectors Kema-Xenergy et al. (2004)
show an implementation rate for energy efﬁcient appliances to be
around 50% and IEA (2007) shows an implementation rate for
space heating measures of around 50%. Thollander and Palm
(2013) cite three government initiatives (based on energy audits
and recommendations that aimed to promote implementation of
energy efﬁciency in organisations) had implementation rates be-
tween 40% and 80%. Therefore, the implementation rate of op-
erational measures for shipping can be said in the same range as
the aforementioned sectors, where the energy efﬁciency gap has
been established. The aforementioned sources also conﬁrmed the
implementation of energy efﬁciency measures differed sig-
niﬁcantly between owned (owner-occupied) and rented proper-
ties, conﬁrming the efﬁciency principal agent problem i.e. case
two. The extent to which the implementation of cost-effective
measures in shipping differs according to the principal agent cases
is shown in Fig. 12.
Fig. 13 shows the zero order relationships (uncontrolled) be-
tween the implementation of the top three operational measures
and chartering group (denoting the two principal agent cases
under investigation). It can be seen that there exists to some ex-
tent a relationship between the chartering group and three op-
erational measures. For example, for the speed reduction measure,
it can be seen that group one and three (ﬂeet mainly chartered out
voyage) had lower implementation compared group two and four
Fig. 11. Comparing efﬁciency parameters for voyage (case 4) and time charters (case 2).
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weather routing measure and to some extent for fuel consumption
monitoring measure. This suggests that operational measures
may not be susceptible to the principal agent problem and this is
because the charterer has operational control as well as the in-
centive to save fuel which is under their account, switching the
time charter (from case two) to case one of Table 2 for operational
measures. Controlling the above relationships for sectorstrengthens the relationship further and statistically signiﬁcantly
for the drybulk sector for the three measures.
The different categories of goal conﬂict discussed in Table 10
belonged to speciﬁc sectors, for example the lack of express
mention of reasonable despatch was only found in general form
charterparties (used for trades for which no speciﬁcally approved
form is in force) e.g. Gencon makes no mention utmost despatch
for the loading or discharging leg. The difference between the bulk
Fig. 12. Implementation of cost-effective operational measures by chartering group or cases.
Fig. 13. Implementation of operational measures by chartering group.
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where liner bill of ladings e.g. Conlinebill, permit the owner/op-
erator to slow steam. These results are consistent with the survey
ﬁndings, which reﬂect the perception of respondents in those
sectors, where almost 80% of drybulk and wetbulk sector per-
ceived standard utmost dispatch clauses as a signiﬁcant barrier to
speed reduction compared to around 60% of respondents in thecontainer sector. One of the ways operational energy efﬁciency has
been realised is through revisiting the utmost despatch clause, for
example the’Virtual Arrival’ clause (OCIMF and INTERTANKO,
2010) which allows a vessel’s speed to be reduced in order to meet
a revised arrival time (e.g. due to lack of cargo storage at port),
thus enabling the vessel to arrive at a port at the right time (Just in
Time – JIT). Virtual arrival therefore shifts the port waiting time
Table 11
Coding categories for the goal conﬂict arising in speed reduction measure.
Voyage
charterparty
Utmost
despatch to
load port
Utmost des-
patch to
discharge
ports
ETA/ERL Speciﬁc
NOR
times
Speciﬁc
NOR
place
BIMCHEMVOY ✓ ✓ through
B/L
✓ ✗ ✗
INTERTANKVOY ✓ ✓ through
B/L
✓ ✗ ✗
ASBATANKVOY ✓ ✓ through
B/L
✓ ✗ ✗
BEEPEEVOY 4 Stated
speed
Stated speed ✓ ✗ ✗
SHELLVOY 6 ✓ þ stated
speed
Stated speed ✓ ✗ ✗
COALOREVOY ✗ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓
OREVOY ✗ ✓ or re-
duced speed
✓ ✗ ✓
NIPPONORE ✓ ✓ ✓ User ✓
POLCOLVOY ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗
SYNACOMEX ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
BHPBVOY03 ✓ ✓ ✓ User ✓
NIPPONCOAL ✓ ✓ ✓ User ✓
NUBALTWOOD ✓ ✓ through
B/L
✓ ✓ ✗
RIO DOCE ORE ✓ ✓ ✓
AMWELSH ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
GRAINCON ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
GENCON ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓
SCANCON ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓
NUVOY ✗ ✓ or re-
duced speed
✓ User User
Table 10
Charterparty clauses affecting implementation of speed reduction in voyage charters
Coding category and questions Deﬁnition Example Coding rule
Goal conﬂict Conﬂicting interests between the char-
terer (principal) and shipowner (agent),
which means use of:-Utmost despatch
clauses in both voyage legs
“The said vessel being suitable for mechanical
loading and grab discharge, shall with all con-
venient speed sail and proceed to the loading
port. ...Being so loaded the vessel shall there-
with proceed with all convenient speed to the
discharging ports”
VSG1¼utmost despatch in bal-
last leg (load port) AND laden
leg (discharge port)
Q: How does the outcome based con-
tract address the principal agent
speed goal conﬂict?
Conﬂicting interests between the char-
terer (principal) and shipowner (agent),
which means use of:-Utmost despatch
clauses only in laden leg
“The vessel shall proceed with due despatch to a
safe port, berth, dock.... For loading the cargo, as
ordered by charterers... And being so loaded
proceed as ordered on signing of Bill of Lading ...
As ordered by charterers”
VSG2¼utmost despatch in only
laden leg
Q: How does the goal conﬂict affect
speed reduction measure
implementation?
Conﬂicting interests between the char-
terer (principal) and shipowner (agent),
but no use of utmost despatch clauses.
“The said vessel shall proceed to the loading
port....and being so loaded the vessel shall pro-
ceed to the discharging ports...”
VSG3¼No utmost despatch
clause
Conﬂicting interests between the char-
terer (principal) and shipowner (agent),
which means use of: -Slow steaming
clause
“…However, unless 'no' is inserted in box 17
Part A, the owners may order the vessel to
proceed at reduced speed solely to conserve
fuel”
VSG4¼Slow steaming clause is
present
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reduction, generally shared 50-50 between the shipowner and
charterer, without affecting demurrage income that would have
been gained had laytime been exceeded (Laytime refers to the
loading/discharging window and when this is exceeded the ship-
owner is entitled to liquidated damages called demurrage). This
clause is also in the process of being drafted into commonly used
industry charterparties by BIMCO. Table 11 shows that there is
clear difference in the voyage charterparties of the different sec-
tors for other clauses that could be affecting implementation of
speed reduction measures, such as place of tendering, Notice of
Readiness (NOR) and timing of NOR (i.e. when a ship is ready loador discharge). Wetbulk charterparties generally were found to be
port charters whereas most drybulk charterparties were observed
to be berth charterparties. Similarly, for NOR times, there were
clear sectoral differences in the charterparties. Wetbulk charter-
parties had no speciﬁc times in which NOR has to be tendered
whereas in contrast majority of the drybulk and general charter-
parties had speciﬁc times in which shipowners had to tender NOR.
Therefore, the utmost dispatch clauses, place of NOR and timing of
NOR affect the implementation of speed reduction measure in the
voyage charter.
The survey results showed that operational measures had
higher implementation in case two i.e. in time charters compared
to case four i.e. voyage charters. The ﬁnding for the observed level
of energy efﬁciency (both technical and operational) from analysis
of ﬁxtures for the year 2011 shows that there is not a signiﬁcant
difference between the operational efﬁciency of ships on the dif-
ferent types of charter. Comparing means using independent
sample t-tests (95% conﬁdence level, two tailed tests) for each ship
type also suggested that the null hypothesis (no difference in
means) could not be rejected for the average operational efﬁciency
and ratio of operational speed to design speed. Because of the low
number of cases (in the time charter) the results cannot be cor-
roborated with the survey ﬁndings on the level of implementation
of operational measures by the different chartering groups. This
problem is also acknowledged in literature (e.g. IEA, 2007) that
ﬁnding the real energy efﬁciency or energy consumption for dif-
ferent cases in principal agent matrix is rarely straightforward.5. Conclusions and policy implications
The survey results showed that the implementation rate of the top
three energy efﬁciency measures do not correspond to their high
energy saving potential and cost-effectiveness. The implementation
rate of these measures is similar to the aforementioned shipping in-
dustry studies that have investigated the barriers to energy efﬁciency
and that of other sectors, showing implementation rate range of
around 50–75%. Case two of the principal agent matrix (Table 2) i.e.
the efﬁciency problem, proposes that the technical efﬁciency of the
ship will be lower due to shipowner being responsible for capital costs
and time charterer responsible for voyage (including fuel costs), unless
the shipowner-operator can recoup the investment in energy efﬁ-
ciency through higher charter rates for the savings in energy made by
the charterer. For operational measures it was suggested that case two
of the principal agent problem i.e. ‘efﬁciency problem’would be lower
N. Rehmatulla, T. Smith / Energy Policy 84 (2015) 44–5756because the time charterer has operational control as well as the in-
centive to save fuel which is under their account, thus switching the
time charter (from case two) to case one of Table 2 for operational
measures. This is reﬂected in the implementation of operational
measures, which consistently showed that ships on time charter had
higher implementation of operational measures. This seems to suggest
that implementation of operational measures may not be affected by
the principal agent problem to the same extent as technical measures.
Perhaps the reason for this is that the principal i.e. the charterer would
rather implement operational measures in a time charter, one of the
reasons for this being energy efﬁciency information is difﬁcult to ob-
serve (similar to credence goods) and to monetize during the con-
tracting process.
The speed reduction measure is commonly suggested to have
the highest fuel saving potential and under the current market
conditions it would be envisaged that it would be implemented to
the highest levels but the survey results show otherwise. On aver-
age it was implemented by around 65–70% of the respondents and
breaking this down by chartering group shows that general speed
reduction implementation is higher in ships under time charter
than ships under voyage charter. Satellite AIS data also conﬁrms this
ﬁnding, as not all ships were operating at lower speeds compared to
the design speed (Smith et al., 2013). Possible explanations to the
lack of uptake can be obtained from the results of the modelling
(Smith, 2012; Rehmatulla and Smith, 2012) and charterparty con-
tent analysis, which suggest that with reduction in EEDI, operating
speed increases due to a lightening of the cost burden of ‘speeding-
up’ of technologically more efﬁcient ships, increased capital costs,
and the use of speed for a competitive advantage.
The presence of these barriers creates complexity for policy
makers. On the one hand, the presence of market failures implies
that a market-based measure would not be a cost-effective means
to drive change. This then incentivises the use of command and
control regulation such as minimum energy efﬁciency requirements
for a ship’s technical speciﬁcation (e.g. EEDI as deﬁned in MARPOL
Annex VI), or for a ship’s operation (e.g. some type of speed limit or
target for EEOI). As this work identiﬁes signiﬁcant market barriers,
shipping is unlikely to respond efﬁciently to market stimuli such as
a carbon price. However, there can also be problems with command
and control measures, as it is possible to foresee scenarios where
the outcome of their implementation could be perverse (for ex-
ample mandatory technical efﬁciency standards being compensated
through changes in operational efﬁciency).
The data (survey results, charterparty content analysis and
ﬁxtures analysis) that has been used to date to draw inferences is,
believed to be some of the best available data. However, un-
certainty remains and given the signiﬁcance of the issues that are
being addressed and the risk of creating unnecessary burden on
the shipping industry with ineffective regulation, further work
would appear to be required. The advent of an IMO (ideally) or EU
Monitoring Reporting and Veriﬁcation (MRV) regulation would go
some way to improving the quality of the data available for as-
sessing the system dynamics and barriers to energy efﬁciency in
the shipping industry.Acknowledgements
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